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In 2011, Iceland President Ólafur Ragnar Grimsson argued that the financial crisis that so roiled 
his country had shown that political science could no longer “play second fiddle to the models of 
modern economics.” Implicit in this statement is one of the governing myths of modern 
economics, namely that economic models are objective, predictive, scientific frameworks that 
explain the naturalistic operation of economic forces. Yet, the ongoing financial crisis 
demonstrates that economics is instead something far more social. We argue that in the response 
to the crisis, economic models have functioned as packages of norms that establish the field of 
political contestation, delimiting the range of policy responses. If economic models function as 
packages of norms rather than value-neutral explanations of economic functionality, then they 
become amenable to analysis using the tools developed in constructivism. Specifically, we draw 
on Checkel’s work exploring the factors that shape norm diffusion to examine the dynamics of 
norms contestation, seeking to understand difference in economic norms acceptance and the role 
of economic-models-as-norms-packages in the transatlantic debates over how to address the 
crisis.  We find that constructivism may not take us far enough to explain the paradox of the 
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austerity push in Europe and therefore propose a coupling of constructivist insights with a more 
critically inspired IPE approach.  
Introduction 
In early 2012, news stories on the deepening European sovereign debt crisis reported that 
some in the Greek media repeatedly referred to Germany and its leaders as Nazis (Heyer and 
Batzoglou, 2012).  Other reports pointed to increasing resentment of Germany across Europe 
The European Union (EU), at the behest of Germany and other likeminded states in the north, 
pressed the southern countries facing financial instability to implement a difficult package of 
neoliberal economic policies focused on government austerity as a condition of economic 
support.  The policy was and continues to be a striking one.  The Europeans—particularly the 
Germans—had argued that the start of the global financial crisis in 2008 was the product of the 
neoliberal economic structures of the United States.  The implication was that the social market 
and social democratic models of Europe, with their greater involvement in managing economic 
systems, represented a superior form of political economic organization (Associated Press, 
2008).  And yet, as the 2008 financial crisis shifted from the United States to Europe, a role 
reversal took place.  The United States found itself with increasing regularity advising the EU 
against neoliberal economic policies even as these polices gained strength (Castle and Story, 
2011).  These policies have continued apace despite strong criticism from U.S. macroeconomists 
like Paul Krugman (Krugman, 2011) and the International Monetary Fund   Even the 
traditionally neoliberal newspaper The Economist has critiqued Europe’s austerity drive (The 
Economist, 2012). 
Much of the attention on the Euro crisis focuses on the causes as well as tactical level 
responses by European leaders.  For example, in a symposium on the crisis in the Journal of 
Common Market Studies (Verdun, 2012), not one article discussed the broader reasons for the 
European approach to the crisis.  Driving much of this discussion is an underlying assumption of 
economics as problem solving, that the primary issue is finding the correct technical fix or fixes 
to bring the system back in balance.  We adopt a different starting point for analysis. Our focus is 
on the larger strategic decision by EU leaders.  Specifically, the adoption of neoliberal inspired 
economic policies by the EU is the central puzzle of this article.  How did austerity come to take 
on such a prominent place in European economic policy? Why were the northern European states 
the most vested in pursuing neoliberal economic policies?  In an effort to account for these 
questions, we conceptualize economics and its theories not as pseudo-natural laws but instead 
packages of norms prescribing the ways in which states, policymakers, and societies should 
understand and engage with the economy.  To understand then why some norms are accepted 
over others, we turn to the work of Jeffrey Checkel and other constructivists, who emphasize 
focusing on the ways in which international norms do or do not resonate with domestic social 
structures.  In asking these questions, however, we also tap into a larger discussion regarding the 
competition within capitalist societies between neoliberal and social democratic or social market 
economics.  This competition can be understood not as a contest to determine which system 
‘objectively’ governs the political economy better, but rather which set of economic norms 
society will abide.  In discussing these issues, this article begins to bridge the gap between 
constructivist and critical studies of the international political economy. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we discuss scholarship on the linkage 
between international norms and domestic socio-political structures.  We also in this section 
address the literature applying constructivist theories to international political economy.  In the 
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second section, we develop an analytical framework for understanding the crisis in Europe.  We 
follow this with an exploration of the social and political dynamics of the crisis.  Finally, we 
conclude with thoughts about the social nature of economics and the linkages between critical 
and constructivist studies of international political economy. 
International Norms and Domestic Impact 
Constructivism, arising as it did in the context of international theory concerned with the 
influence of international structures, initially focused on the role of international social structures 
in driving state behavior (Wendt, 1999).  In part that focus fit the prevailing conception of the 
study of international relations, but in part it was a strategic move designed to confront the so-
called ‘mainstream’ theories of structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism on their own 
ontological ground.  Even so, as constructivism came into its own voices called for greater 
attention to how exactly international norms shape state behavior.  Klotz’s work on the influence 
of global anti-apartheid norms in shaping altering U.S. foreign policy stands out as an early 
example (Klotz, 1995).  The calls for understanding how international norms interact with 
domestic social and political structures were perhaps most clearly elucidated in work by Jeffrey 
Checkel, Andrew Cortell, and James Davis.  Cortell and Davis identify two factors that condition 
the ability of political actors to appeal to international norms in order to influence state behavior: 
domestic political structure and the domestic salience of the norm (Cortell and Davis, 1996, 
Cortell and Davis, 2000).  In this argument, norms are political tools actors use to further their 
interests.  Their ability to do so depends on the level of decision-making centralization and the 
relation of the state to society.  More important from our perspective is their concept of salience.  
According to Cortell and Davis, the salience of international norms is the legitimacy they are 
granted in the domestic context.  They envision legitimacy as existing on a spectrum, from 
outright dismissal by the state to full discursive and legal integration of the norm into the state.  
In line with their utilitarian perspective on norms, the authors then go on to hypothesize about 
the different ways in which political actors draw on norms depending on the configuration of 
political structure and norm salience.   
Perhaps arising from their political rationalist or utilitarian perspective, Cortell and Davis 
underdevelop the concept of salience.  For example, in their 1996 article the authors go into 
some detail regarding the ways in which political structure conditions the influence of norms, yet 
less than a page is dedicated to exploring salience, and much of it refers to either the ‘state’ or 
policy makers.  The social structures that inform salience are left aside.  In their defense, Cortell 
and Davis later identify the literature-wide failure to engage the concept of salience or legitimacy 
as one of the shortcomings impeding further progress on understanding the domestic impact of 
international norms (Cortell and Davis, 2000:67). 
 Building on Cortell and Davis, but taking a more explicitly constructivist approach, 
Checkel also sets out a framework for understanding how political and social structures 
condition norm acceptance (Checkel, 1997, Checkel, 1999).  Like Cortell and Davis, Checkel 
also pays attention to political actors as norms agents.  Similar to Cortell and Davis, Checkel 
holds that political structure shapes norms acceptance, although Checkel’s approach emphasizes 
the ways in which shifts in political structure shift the constraining versus constitutive influence 
of international norms.  The more political authority is concentrated and the greater the distance 
of the state from society, the more norms take on constitutive characteristics.  This is because as 
power is concentrated and policy makers are removed from society, the less influence society (or 
groups within in it) are able to exert, thus reducing the constraining effect of norms from the 
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perspective of the policy maker.  That is, in highly politicized contexts policy makers operate as 
Cortell and Davis envision, as rational actors using norms in a utilitarian way to pursue their 
interests.  Conversely, the constitutive nature of norms increases, because for norms to impact 
policy as authority is concentrated they must reshape her/his conceptions of her/himself and the 
world.  Paralleling Cortell and Davis’s concept of salience, Checkel forwards a claim that 
‘cultural match’ conditions the willingness of policy makers to take on international norms.  This 
effect operates on a sliding scale.  Where domestic norms contradict the international norm, the 
odds of empowerment are low, and where domestic norms mirror the international norm, the 
odds of empowerment are high.  In most cases, however, the match between domestic culture 
and international norms is somewhere between the two extremes. 
The approaches set out by Cortell and Davis as well as Checkel draw the attention of 
analysts back to the domestic context, a crucial move in a world where the social, political, and 
economic fabric within states is much thicker than it is between states.  Thus, if we are to 
understand international dynamics, scholars cannot assume away domestic dynamics.  However, 
in applying these approaches to the EU highlights some weaknesses in thinking about the 
influence of international norms.  The authors tend to think about the norms dynamic in terms of 
a relatively simple domestic-international binary.  Yet, in the EU the system of governance is 
more complicated, with power distributed across states and within the EU-level governance 
structures.  While this complexity does not automatically mean that the approaches laid out by 
Checkel and Cortell and Davis are flawed, it does provide reason for careful examination.  In 
particular, the absence of thinking about the role of bureaucracy—a high profile element in the 
EU—as a third element apart from policy makers and society is notable.  Also underdeveloped is 
the concept of identity apart from norms.  Checkel’s cultural match is suggestive of identity, but 
he focuses on cultural norms rather than on broader identity.  Again, the EU crisis suggests that 
identity plays an important role in norms acceptance.  The discourses in the EU crisis are loaded 
with identity, from northern assumptions of ‘lazy southerners’ to the use of Nazi imagery in the 
south (Böll and Böcking, 2011, Heyer and Batzoglou, 2012, Judah, 2012).  Thus, norms 
acceptance is linked to more than just domestic norms.  It is linked to how states and societies 
understand themselves in the regional and global context.  Certainly norms are part of this, but 
they are interlinked as part of identity packages (Hayes, 2012).  Finally, there is a sense in which 
domestic politics is underdeveloped in both approaches.  While Checkel as well as Cortell and 
Davis emphasize the importance of domestic politics, both focus largely on policy makers 
(Checkel less so).  Relatedly, both also do not conceive of norms as discursive constructions, 
instead largely envisioning the interaction of international norms and domestic political and 
social structure as something almost mechanical, of pieces being fitted together—either 
rationalist political actors using norms for utilitarian ends (Cortell and Davis) or policy makers 
constrained by norms imposed by society (Checkel).  Admittedly, Checkel’s emphasis on social 
learning is far more accommodative of understanding the social nature of norms, he largely 
limits this to non-politicized systems (e.g. nondemocracies).  Yet the discursive or 
communicative turn (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, Müller, 2004, Risse, 2003, Schmidt, 2010) in 
International Relations suggests that the relations between state and society as well as norms as 
traditionally understood by constructivists—in terms of appropriateness and constitution—
remain important in politicized contexts.  
The application of constructivist approaches to the crisis presumes a specific perspective 
on the nature of the political economy.  That is, that economic processes and behavior is socially 
constructed rather than rationally or mechanically determined.  In other words, economic 
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systems are social systems informed by social mechanisms and processes.  While constructivist 
approaches in IR have gained significant ground in many areas of International Relations, they 
have only slowly penetrated the study of international political economy.  This lacuna or lag in 
the application of constructivist approaches to IPE scholarship was in fact a primary motivation 
of the edited volume produced by Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons, Constructing the International 
Economy (2010).  A brief overview of the central arguments made by the editors as well as a 
synthesis of some of the core insights of the contributors will be discussed here highlighting the 
opportunity for the approach taken in our paper, namely the simultaneous engagement of both 
critical and constructivist perspectives on how to better understand and interpret the causes and 
consequences of the crisis in order to make sense of and properly analyze US and European 
discourses and policy responses to it.  
  Resonant with the claim posited at the outset of our paper that economic activity is far 
more social than most economists (and for that matter, political scientists who merely deploy 
economic theories of human behavior to investigate political phenomena) acknowledge, the 
editors of Constructing the International Economy advance the argument that a purely materialist 
view of theory is simply untenable.  Embracing such a view, the authors therefore urge scholars 
to at least entertain the possibility that “economies might vary substantially for nonmaterialist 
reasons” (2010:2).  If indeed the critical, shared insight of constructivism is that collectively held 
ideas fundamentally shape the social, economic, and political worlds we inhabit, then theories 
and explanatory models that do not concede that behavior whether at the individual, firm or 
government level is not reducible to structural or materially derived incentives will produce 
incomplete or spurious analyses at best.  Nonetheless, a recent survey of IPE scholarship by two 
mainstream, well known scholars revealed that the IPE subfield was marked by a near consensus 
on the theories, methods and approaches and research questions deemed important at least by 
North American scholars if less the case in European scholarship (Frieden and Martin, 2003).  
And noticeably absent from the survey was any substantial room for the role that norms, ideas 
and identities play in explaining policy outcomes or actions of states. According to conventional 
thinking in mainstream IPE scholarship then, action varies not by different perceptions or 
interpretations of the world but rather with the resources held or strategic positions occupied by 
actors that determine interests and therefore allow observers and analysts to predict or explain 
action and behavior.  Such a rationalist and thoroughly materialist view is what is being 
challenged by constructivist theory generally of course and so a brief discussion of how or why 
constructivism has become more prevalent in the general IR literature than that of IPE is quite 
illuminating.   
Why is it that the main preoccupations of IR theory—the study of conflict and 
cooperation, war and peace between states have become saturated with constructivist theories 
and arguments to the point that Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons suggest that arguments about social 
constructions and emphasis on identities, norms and symbols appear commonsensical or even 
border on becoming clichés and yet we observe no such development in IPE scholarship? In 
essence, the influence of Peter Katzenstein’s book The Culture of National Security has seen no 
parallel in the subfield of IPE (1996).  An unsurprising but still rather ironic fact is that the 
prediction (or even rough anticipation) by IPE scholars of the current financial crisis was as 
absent from theoretical and empirical scholarship as was the remarkable failure of IR theories to 
foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union.   Could one surmise that the current reverberations of 
the 2008 US generated financial crisis, now full-blown global (if more acutely felt in Europe) 
crisis is the economic equivalent to the geopolitical and strategic changes and uncertainties of the 
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immediate post- Cold War period?  Even if a bit exaggerated, perhaps the theoretical and 
empirical lessons learned from Katzenstein’s constructivist turn could bring added value to what 
we might call the crisis of reason stemming from the multidimensionality of the latest capitalist 
crisis.   
If the Varieties of Capitalism school has any continued relevance surely it is that there is 
no single logic or institutional symmetry that obtains in the various models of capitalist 
democracies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Indeed comparative political economy is replete with 
studies arguing against the globalization induced convergence thesis (Albert, 1993, Berger and 
Dore, 1996, Birchfield, 2008, Boyer and Drache, 1996, Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997).  So 
why has Europe missed its moment to firmly assert a different norm constellation and policy 
shift away from the morally depleted and economically corrosive ideologies of neoliberalism and 
instead rally around the virtues of “Social Europe” in more than rhetoric? Is it in fact the case as 
(Apeldoorn, 2002) and Carfruny and Ryner (2007) argued that the European Monetary Union 
heralded an already compromised and thoroughly subordinated European position in the face of 
both the consolidation of transnational European capital as well as US financial hegemony?  Or, 
are these arguments not as overdetermined as mainstream rationalist and neorealist approaches in 
IPE particularly those that misapprehend the real structural power of the US even in the midst of 
the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression?   We return to this question in the 
conclusion but for now, it provides a foreground of how constructivist theorizing when 
juxtaposed to more critical renderings of the causes and consequences of the crisis help us 
discern the chasm between the discourse and the policy actions taken in Europe and the United 
States and the surprising role of the IMF.  
 
Multiple paths to constructivism: Meaning, Cognition, Uncertainty and Subjectivity 
  
In Constructing The International Economy, the editors map out four pathways to 
constructivist theorizing in the hopes of persuading the audience, particularly the IPE skeptics, 
that much can be gained from engagement and debate between constructivist and more 
materialist or rationalist oriented scholars.  Although there are varying justifications undergirding 
each pathway, each of the logics supply a specific rationale for empirical research that explores 
how much social construction matters, how social constructs emerge in the first place and what 
the mechanisms of their effect might be.  Essentially what the editors attempt to do is to clarify 
some of the misconceptions about constructivist scholarship, not to “pillory any and all 
materialist claims about politics” but to show that constructivists come from a diverse array of 
theoretical starting points and should be not reduced to being against science and explanation--
though some may indeed use slightly different language than mainstream nonconstructivists.  
(Abdelal, et al., 2010:8) 
The first and most common route or justification for constructivist theorizing is the path 
of meaning. Tracing this line of thinking back to Max Weber and up through the work of Nicolas 
Onuf and Alexander Wendt, the fundamental starting point is the acknowledgement that humans 
are dependent on meaning and interpretation and that various identities are constituted through 
the authority relationships that make those identities knowable to others. Thus, explanations that 
are not concerned with how actors assign meanings and how those meanings may vary across 
contexts or in terms of myths, symbols, norms, etc., will inevitably miss out on vital information 
that may explain how actors prioritize choice, construct motivations for action and produce 
outcomes (in the materialist sense).  Ultimately, meaning-oriented constructivists hold: 
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that societies and policymakers rarely, if ever, interpret the world around them in 
purely material terms. Rather, they endow the economies in which they are 
embedded with social purpose. These purposes are embedded in a variety of 
collective identities, including national identities. Economic activity and 
international interdependence tend to be treated not as ends in themselves or as 
brute material constraints, but rather as modes of acting within the world 
according to different constituted identities. How societies interpret the material 
processes of production and distribution, or how policymakers recognize patterns 
of interdependence as natural or worrisome, reflects purposes shared among 
members of identity group. (Abdelal, et al., 2010:9) 
 
 The authors point out that a more institutional approach to meaning (Abdelal, 
2007, Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, Kirshner, 2003) asserts that norms of appropriate 
behavior are implied by various state identities and that international norms come to 
define the boundaries of legitimate policymaking. This observation is particularly 
interesting for understanding the crisis responses on both sides of the Atlantic, which we 
will return to in the final section, but for here it is important to raise the question of how 
the norm of neoliberal hegemony has been challenged, contested or as the case seems to 
be at the moment, even further solidified by the various crisis responses in Europe at both 
the national and the EU levels in conjunction with the IMF and via various discursive 
interventions of the United States.  
  
The second pathway or rationale for constructivist analysis is through cognition, namely 
the observation that agents do not so much seek meaning or purpose but rather they “filter 
information from the environment via heuristics and biases and consider it in highly selective 
ways that vary across social settings” (Abdelal, et al., 2010:10). With regard to how social 
constructs arise and how social construction matters and via which mechanisms, cognitively 
oriented scholars hold that social constructs come to shape action not from a need to attach 
meaning but because actors need ‘stabilizing or simplifying frames’ to filter, organize and 
process information in order to act  at all.  Clearly cognitive schemas may play an important role 
in how individuals make sense of material reality and then in turn how constructivists interpret 
economic action.  
 Work by comparative political economists such as Schmidt (2002) and Blyth (2002) best 
illustrate the third pathway, that of uncertainty.  As opposed to nonconstructivist theories which 
tend to assume a materially unambiguous world comprised of actors with clear interests that may 
or may not be realized depending on available resources, information asymmetries and various 
impediments to collective action thereby allowing the analyst to explain outcomes or actions in 
terms of calculable risks, this type of constructivism draws insights from Keynes who found the 
knowledge of the world to be so “fluctuating, vague and uncertain” as to render classical 
economic theories and indeed a scientific basis on which to from calculable probabilities to 
explain things such as wealth accumulation as ineffectual or even inappropriate.  “We simply do 
not know”  (See epigraph on page 1 and discussion on page 12). Constructivist who take the path 
of uncertainty accept the unpredictability of IPE outcomes and therefore enlist the working 
hypothesis that to cope with existence in such an uncertain world, agents “construct stability 
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through the development and deployment of governing ideas, institutions, norms and 
conventions ((Abdelal, et al., 2010:12, Blyth, 2006, March and Olsen, 1996, Schmidt, 2002).   
 Finally, the subjectivity route to constructivism (where most postmodern and critical 
theorists operate) is likely to be the least compelling to mainstream scholars due to their more 
relativistic epistemologies, however, the editors usefully point out that despite differences over 
epistemology, nonconstructivist arguments about objective rationality of observed behavior can 
engage or at least consider claims about actors’ subjectivity.  While maintaining that actors’ 
identities are deeply socially constructed, the path of construction for these approaches is not 
through meaning, cognition, or uncertainty as for three other modes of constructivist theorizing, 
but rather occurs at two levels. First, these scholars think in terms of subjects as opposed to 
preexisting agents. Secondly, such subjects inhabit discursive fields or social contexts within 
which what the subjects ‘truly believe’ is less significant than what is made possible or 
impossible by the position of oneself within a given discourse. “As a consequence, such 
scholars’ positions on what norms “do” differ from those of other constructivists in that they do 
not see norms as simply regulative or even constitutive features of the world. Rather, norms are 
seen as expressions of power in the world insofar as adherence to a norm excludes particular 
actions by defining what it is possible and impossible to say and this do in a given context” 
(Abdelal, et al., 2010:13)  Charlotte Epstein’s study of how whaling came to banned in 1982 
(through the mobilization of nonstate actors in the 1970s) and remains “discursively 
delegitimated” to this day illustrates this logic well in that the extent to which being labeled a 
“good anti-whaling state” makes it impossible to even consider overturning the moratorium 
despite the evidence of ample whale stocks today (Epstein, 2008).  The next example given is 
more pertinent for asserting the value of constructivism for IPE.  In a study of modern 
innovations in finance, Marieke de Goede (2005) reverses Epstein’s problematic and asks instead 
how do practices once frowned upon or deemed abnormal come to be seen as normal? 
 
Unlike whaling, much of modern finance, such as futures markets, options, swaps, 
and the like, was once seen and outlawed as as petty “gambling.”  However, with 
the invention of “technologies of risks”—themselves simply the mathematical 
extrapolation of the same gambler’s problem of pricing—what was once outlawed 
became not only respectable but a cornerstone of the modern economy. In 
elaborating this genealogy, scholars emphasizing the problematic of subjectivity 
argue that it allows us access to a way of knowing the subject that other 
approaches lack. As such, this is an explanatory project; and it is thoroughly 
constructivist (Abdelal, et al., 2010:14).  
 
 In sum, each of these four foundational rationales or justifications for employing 
constructivist approaches may have insights to offer as well as complementary rather than 
necessarily alternative or competitive renditions of or accounting for the world as it exists.   
As the authors put it: “Constructivism, as its name suggests, is mainly about a dynamic process 
of social construction that engages directly with other dynamic claims about how the world came 
together”  (Abdelal, et al., 2010:19). In an inventive conclusion to the volume, the editors probe 
what constructivist theorizing can contribute to our understanding of the crisis by first offering a 
completely materialist account of the crisis and then showing how the constructivist analyses by 
their contributors deploying the pathways of meaning, cognition, uncertainty and subjectivity 
variously challenge or disturb the purported material certainties of the crisis.   Such a clever and 
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compelling approach to synthesizing the arguments of the wide-ranging contributors does not 
lend itself very well to further summary here, but perhaps the cumulative insights of the editors 
and their contributors introduction can be encapsulated in the following Latin terms that they 
themselves invoked albeit not in the exact terms as we seek to here: Qui Bono, Qui Termino, Qui 
Dicto?  Most IR and IPE scholars are familiar with the first phrase as perhaps the classic 
question or central concern of IPE. In fact this can be attributed to one of the founder’s of the 
subfield, Susan Strange, an iconoclastic thinker whose body of work is as ‘unfenceable’ as she 
herself thought the terrain of IPE inquiry should be (Tooze and May, 2002) and whose analysis 
was persistently guided by the determination to uncover “who benefits”.  Many theories, 
frameworks and methods direct scholars who seek to answer this question-- including 
constructivists, yet what the collective contribution of constructivism is in all its guises and 
varying epistemologies is that knowledge and understanding of something as complex as the 
current financial crisis requires that we layer into the core question the other two--who gets to 
define and who gets to speak?   Underscoring their commitment to intellectual openness and 
particularly engagement between constructivists and nonconstructivists, the book concludes with 
four injunctions worth quoting at length here.  
 
The first is to pay attention to uncertainty and the construction of interests.  
Interests are marvelous explanatory tools, but they are also things that need to be 
explained. They are often demonstrably opaque to the agents that supposedly have 
them, and we should remember that before we assert that they are always and 
everywhere in the driver’s seat. The second is to pay attention to the politics of 
meaning….[w]hat a policy means is as important as what it does….[w]ho gets to 
define what something is—that is, to impart meaning to an outcome, and thus 
what we should do about it—requires our sustained scholarly attention. Third, 
there are inescapable politics of cognition. That is, how do agents respond to 
periods of stasis and change given the neural technology they bring to bear on the 
opaque and nonlinear outcome generator that is the international economy? How 
such heuristics, biases, and frames override supposed materially generated 
axiomatics of behavior is also extremely important. Fourth, the politics of identity 
supervenes on all the above. The subject position occupied by an agent in a 
discursive field creates the parameters of the possible for any politics. Forgetting 
this aspect of how discourses and identities both empower and disempower agents 
leads to a materialist reductionism that can only narrow what we know about the 
world (Abdelal, et al., 2010:238) 
 
In the next section we begin to outline an analytical framework that follows the spirit of 
these injunctions in order to make sense of the on-going European debt crises and the 
bewildering recourse to austerity measures even as the IMF and the US counsel against it. Some 
might refer to this moment in the global political economy as more or less neoliberalism redux, 
yet others, including Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons, claim that the era of neoliberalism is over.   
Market fundamentalism seems quite resilient in the United States, yet we think it does not 
accurately or fully explain developments in Europe. Drawing on tools from both constructivism 
and more critical (specifically, Gramscian and Polanyian inspired) IPE may help us more 
reasonably understand the crisis and responses on both sides of the Atlantic and push beyond the 
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temptation to fall back on old orthodoxies and worn-out, threadbare ideologies and 
simplifications about the logic of capitalism(s).  
 
Analytical Framework 
This paper is centrally concerned with the contestation over economic norms in the 
European Union as a basis for understanding how and why economic policy in the EU has taken 
the form and direction it has in the post-2008 crisis period. This is a huge subject, and the 
magnitude of the economic crisis confronting the EU and the world means that scholars will be 
analyzing the same issues we are concerned with for years to come.  Moreover, since the crisis is 
ongoing, ours can only be a first cut at understanding its dynamics.  To do so we draw on the 
discursive turn in International Relations as a means by which scholars can gain insight into the 
ways in which policy makers and societies constructed the crisis and came to understand their 
policy options.  Analyzing the structure and imagery of the discourses has the potential to 
illuminate not just the dynamics of political contestation but also the social structures with which 
political actors are engaged.  
 Key to our approach is communicative action.  We do not forward a theory as such, but 
rather—in keeping with Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010)—emphasize the 
importance of contestation and construction through discourse of ideas and ability of these 
discourses to produce behavior.  However, as Checkel suggests, these discourses and the norms 
they embody do not float freely.  Instead they are shaped by the social structures with which they 
interact.  Thus, regardless of the motivations of the political actors drawing on the discourses, the 
prevalence and success of specific discourses suggests the contours of the social structures with 
which they are engaged.  Discourses unmoored from social structures (what Checkel calls 
cultural match and Cortell and Davis call salience) will fail to find political traction.  In part this 
is because humans are social creatures, and rely on social structures to make sense of their world 
(Hayes, 2012).  In part it is because humans are habitual creatures (Hopf, 2010), and social 
structures represent habituated modes of thinking.  Thus, when we examine economic discourses 
in Europe, we are looking at not just which norms political actors use, but how they use norms as 
well as the discursive constructions that surround them.  In doing so, we do not preconceive a 
theory regarding the form of the discourses, but rather take an inductive approach that allows the 
discourses to emerge through interpretation. To be clear, we are certainly not proffering a 
deductive theory of why certain norms are empowered, but instead we examine  contestation 
through discourses in a more inductive fashion.  
 As both Checkel and Cortell and Davis argue, political structure is important for 
understanding why some norms are empowered over others.  In the EU context, however, the 
picture is more complicated than these authors allow.  Because of the multilevel nature of EU 
governance, policy results from political dynamics not just within states, but also between states 
within the EU and between member states and the European Union political units.  And, in the 
context of the global financial crisis, we also now have to account for the intervention of the IMF 
and the actions of the United States given the economic and financial interpenetration of the 
transatlantic economies.  Thus, political structure does not fit neatly within Checkel’s typology 
of Liberal, Corporatist, Statist, and State-Above-Society (Checkel, 1999:90).  The EU is 
simultaneously different political structures.  In subjects areas like national defense where the 
national level remains ascendant, this multiplicity of governance is less problematic.  However, 
the EU is built on shared economic governance, and thus the multiplicity of governance must be 
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accounted for.  In practice, this means we have to examine the interaction of national and EU 
level discourses.  It also suggests that Checkel’s effort to synthesize rationalist and constructivist 
logics into his theory becomes difficult to maintain because norms have both constitutive and 
constraining effects simultaneously.  Furthermore, the complexity of the EU system suggests that 
Checkel’s claim that constitutive effects are limited in highly politicized situations is 
problematic.  The very complexity of the system lends strength to constitutive dynamics because 
they simplify complex political and social calculations. 
Global Economic Norms and European (Dis)Empowerment 
From the outset of the crisis, two global discourses suggest fairly unified sets of 
economic norms.1  For ease of reference and in keeping with popular nomenclature, we call these 
two packages of norms growth and austerity (European Parliament, 2012).  These approaches, 
built loosely on the contrasting approaches of John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek, 
generally parallel social democratic and liberal approaches to political economy.  According to 
growth norms, governments should actively intervene to prop up flagging economies during 
downturns and inject economic resources through deficit spending to revive demand.  Austerity 
norms hold that government should restrict its interference in the economy during downturns as a 
necessary route to economic rebalancing that will ensure growth in future years.   
Owing to constraints on time, we undertake only an exploratory analysis of the discursive 
construction of economic norms, with a specific focus on Germany.  Future versions of this 
study will expand the analysis to include other countries, specifically France, and EU level 
discourses.  We anticipate that discourses in France will prove particularly illuminating owing to 
the shift in government control from Nicolas Sarkozy to Francois Hollande.  So why focus on 
Germany?  Throughout the crisis, Germany has occupied a, if not the, leading position in 
fashioning the economic policy response in Europe.  From that standpoint alone, Germany must 
be a primary case study.  Additionally, however, is the tension inherent in Germany visibly 
taking the lead within Europe.  As one of us finds elsewhere (Hayes and James, 2012), Germany 
in the post-Cold War world has conscientiously sought to avoid outright leadership positions in 
Europe, instead striving for consensus.  Thus, the agency of German policymakers and the 
interaction of that agency with German social structures in the context of economic norms takes 
on increased salience. 
In her 2012 New Year’s address, German Chancellor Angela Merkel framed Germany’s 
economic policy as a means of solidifying the European community (Merkel, 2012).  After 
mentioning the reconciliation of Germany and France in the Elyse Treaty (key to the European 
community), Merkel laid the groundwork for understanding policy through the community lens 
by linking economic activity with community and social cohesion:  
 
There are friends and neighbors who take the initiative or put problems right. There are 
the families who provide loving care for their children and their family members every 
day. There are trade unionists and entrepreneurs who work together to ensure job 
security. 
 
                                                  
1 Although we do not address the issue here, it is an interesting question as to why these two normative systems 
became the primary lenses through which the crisis was understood at the global level. 
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Merkel then carried this theme of community into a construction of the EU debt crisis, 
with the addition of the concept of balance: 
 
We need the right balance for our prosperity and our cohesion. We need a willingness to 
achieve as well as social security for all. 
 
The European sovereign debt crisis shows us how important this balance is. The reforms 
we have agreed to are beginning to take effect. But we still need a lot of patience. The 
crisis is far from over. 
 
More needs to be done internationally, as well, to monitor the financial markets. The 
world has not sufficiently learned the lesson of the devastating financial crisis of 2008. 
For never again must such irresponsibility be allowed to take hold as it did then. In the 
social market economy, the state is the guardian of order, and the public must be able to 
place its trust in it. 
 
Several points are interesting here. Merkel constructs Germany’s preferred economic 
policy as building a European community (“for all”) as well as a means to social security.  This 
fits with post war uneasiness of Germans to take high profile policy leadership positions in 
Europe.  At a press conference earlier in 2012, Merkel again sought to construct German policy 
as following from a broader EU consensus.  In discussing the ‘negative feelings’ toward the 
German position in Greece, Merkel argued “in Greece, some people tend to forget that I didn't 
think up these programmes but rather that they're all from the ECB, the European Commission 
and the IMF… didn't invent them, I couldn't just think up such economic programmes even if I 
wanted to” (The Local, 2012).  Merkel’s policy is not a means of asserting German authority, but 
rather a means of strengthening the European community and ensuring European welfare.  This 
theme was consistent in Merkel’s representations of German policy.  In a September 2011 
speech to the German Bundestag, Merkel repeated emphasized the importance of ‘more Europe’ 
and that German policy was intended to ensure a ‘humanitarian and responsible’ Germany within 
a united Europe (Merkel, 2011).  Combined with the concept of balance, a message of fairness is 
communicated to the audience.  German policy then is a matter of ensuring fairness, which is a 
principle norm of liberal economic systems—they (purportedly) ensure a level or fair playing 
field.  This is in contrast to social democratic systems, where the norm of equality plays a greater 
role in shaping economic policy.  Interesting is her invocation of the ‘social market economy,’ 
where there is clearly greater emphasis on the market than we might expect in a social 
democratic context.  Her conceptualization of the role of government fits with this construction 
and with liberal political economic norms.  Rather than acting directly to ensure social welfare, 
as in social democratic redistribution programs, the role of government is to regulate economy to 
combat bad behavior. 
Obviously, the temporal scope of this data is not sufficient to draw anything but the most 
tentative of conclusions, and in future iterations of this paper more texts will be incorporated to 
strengthen the empirical basis for conclusions.  From the texts included here, however, some 
conclusions can be made.  Merkel’s discourses suggest that there is a strong norm operative 
within German society for avoiding overt European leadership.  Merkel goes to some length to 
disavow responsibility for the austerity policies.  The emphasis on social market and the reliance 
on the state and a regulator suggest strong German norms regarding the role of the state in the 
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economy, in contrast to traditional liberal efforts to minimize the state.  However, the implicit 
reliance on the concept of fairness suggests a level of compatibility with liberal economic 
precepts that enables Merkel to pursue austerity measures with regard to the rest of Europe.  
Missing in the constructions, at least those we have covered here, is a sense of an ‘us versus 
them’ identity as a basis for policy.  Indeed, Merkel consistently emphasizes the importance of 
community and the cohesion of the EU.  This might suggest a reticence on the part of Germans 
to view the crisis through that lens. 
 What this initial analysis suggests is that the more meaning-oriented, identity-based, 
constructivist argument, while certainly instructive about the specificities of national self-
understandings in relation to global economic norms, does not tell the full story or explain the 
conundrum of why there seems to be a flip-flop of European and US responses to the crisis with 
the EU taking a more disciplinarian approach and the US purportedly becoming more strongly 
Keynesian or as the cover of The Economist portrayed it  “America Turns European” with the 
mock-up of President Obama sporting a French beret and baguette as if to suggest a new 
American era of social welfarism.  Rather than proposing a competing or alternative 
interpretation, what our framework seeks to do is first investigate what a narrative that 
simultaneously takes into consideration the transatlantic and global dimension might elucidate.  
What we wish to argue is that to understand both the causes as well as the responses to the crisis 
on both sides of the Atlantic, analysts have much to learn from a combination of empirically 
based, yet competing materialist interpretations of the economic logics and policy stances in the 
transatlantic space.  A re-examination of the 2007 argument by Cafruny and Ryner (2007) in 
light of the crisis at first glance may seem to affirm the thesis that indeed Europe is in the 
shadow of US -led neoliberal hegemony, yet the flip-flop referred to above confounds this as 
well. One could easily assert the contradictions of capitalism as the first entry point into solving 
the paradox, yet two other recent studies instantly reveal the limitations of this more orthodox, 
historical materialist approach. First, Schelke’s (2005, 2006) work had also previously elucidated 
the disciplinarian approach to macroeconomic policy in EU policymaking yet his argument did 
not share the neo-Gramscian logic of Europe at Bay.  Further, the recent analysis by Woll in the 
Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons volume reveals that scholarship that assumes the neoliberal and 
liberalization preferences and interests of business (both US and European) are simply incorrect 
(Woll, 2010). In a study of US and European telecoms and airlines, she finds that firms on both 
sides of the Atlantic were not quick proponents of liberalization as assumed and that classic trade 
policy predictions based on purely material interests of firms fail to account for the actual policy 
stances observed. Her analysis illustrates with empirical evidence that rational choice accounts 
that assume economic interests of firms are flawed in part because they rely on a presumption 
that interests are exogenous to the policy process whereas in her case studies, it is evident that 
firms faced with uncertainty were essentially constructing and reconstructing and essentially 
trying to figure out what their interests really were throughout the process of liberalization of 
their industries.  What these studies have in common is that they the level of analysis at which 
they are operating takes the EU and the transatlantic contexts into consideration even if the 
theoretical orientations are divergent.  A look at Schelkle’s (2012)recent comparative analysis of 
the crisis responses by European and US policymakers will further support the position we are 
advocating.  
In a strictly empirical examination of the actual policy responses taken by the EU and the 
US in the early period of the crisis, Schelkle challenges the conventional wisdom that the 
stimulus responses were vastly different. He shows with hard data that the actual differences had 
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to do with approach more than effects with the US bailing out banks and the European using 
automatic stabilizers. What the analysis reveals is that the European and US responses are not in 
fact as different as has been assumed but the norms invoked and the rhetoric used differ in 
significant ways.  In the United States, the policy response was constructed as exceptional, a 
situation that represented a departure from sound economic policy as traditionally understood: 
“the US had to suspend the good governance principles of refraining from fiscal activism, 
ensuring the material independence of the central bank from the Treasury, and exercising 
budgetary oversight under the norm of economic efficiency.”  In the EU by contrast, the 
response to the crisis, and the institutions it was directed through, were constructed as 
embodying traditionally accepted economic governance principles:  However, as Schelkle 
nuanced analysis shows: “good governance institutions have proven their political value to 
governments throughout this crisis, especially since the lack of joined-up stabilization efforts has 
not hindered reasonably effective crisis management domestically. Good governance institutions 
still have their political uses, especially in such weak polities as the EU. But they are not the 
embodiment of economic rationality that their proponents once thought.” (2012:44) As the 
author claims, her argument advances an analysis of the difference in terms of contestation over 
the boundaries between macroeconomic stabilization and distributive politics.  What is important 
in her analysis for our purposes is to underscore (more forcefully than she did herself perhaps) 
how the norms and the discourses around them vary more than the actual content or effect of the 
policies themselves. 
 
Paradoxically and contrary to what the philosophy of good governance states, 
prioritizing economic stability in a crisis meant that US authorities had to ignore 
the boundaries drawn by these institutions while member states in the EU insisted 
on respecting them for political reasons, even though this was economically 
destabilizing.  What is noteworthy about the figures for Europe is the diversity of 
responses, contradicting the view that the fiscal framework imposes a one- size-
fits-all policy. It can also explain why it has been difficult to get a sense of the 
EU’s response (Blanchard, 2009; Krugman, 2009). National rhetoric has typically 
been the opposite of action: while the German government has been vocal about 
the need for fiscal restraint, it decided on one of the larger discretionary packages, 
while France and the UK, urging their European neighbors to go for large 
interventions, stimulated much less. (Schelkle, 2012:44)  
In the end, Schelkle’s observations about the outcome of economic policy in the US and 
EU and the relationship of those outcomes to US and EU institutions draws attention back to our 
central premise: that economics is social.  Certainly, materiality matters—understood both in 
neoliberal and historical materialist terms—but materiality operates in a social context, and thus 
in conjunction with ideational and sociological factors.  Focusing on materiality to the exclusion 
of the social dynamic it occurs within means that analysts and policymakers end up with a 
narrow dichotomous perspective focused on economic rationality and irrationality.  Accordingly, 
the emphasis is on how to engineer out ‘irrationality.’  The cost is that analysts fail to see that 
‘irrationality’ is an irrevocable element of economic processes, because those processes are not 
purely, or perhaps even predominantly, material. 
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